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UNITED STATES V. JOHN W. HINCKLEY JR.
(1982)
Vincent J. Fuller*
At the time John Hinckley Jr. took aim and shot President
Ronald Reagan in March of 1981,1 the law of insanity in the District
of Columbia provided that an accused was not deemed criminally re-
sponsible for his acts if, at the time of the commission of the crime,
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, "lacks substan-
tial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law.",2 This standard was
first adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in United States v. Brawner.3 A fundamental change to
then-existing insanity law substituted the word "appreciate" for the
word "knowledge" or "know" in the test for insanity.
4
This was to become a critical issue in the 1982 trial of John
Hinckley for his March 1981 attack on President Reagan.5 The trial
proved to be a very challenging, but exhausting engagement. After
preliminary interviews of John and his parents, it was quite apparent
to me and my colleagues that he was mentally disturbed at the time
of the 1981 shooting. The critical issue we confronted was to estab-
lish that Hinckley did not "appreciate" the "wrongfulness" of his
* Vincent J. Fuller, a prominent criminal defense attorney in Washington,
D.C., represented John Hinckley as his lead counsel in the U.S. v. Hinckley
trial. He graduated from Williams College in 1952, obtained his LL.B. in 1956
and his LL.D. in 1988, both from Georgetown University.
1. See Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded in Chest by Gunman, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at Al.
2. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1972), super-
seded on other grounds, Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994);
United States v. Shorter, 343 A.2d 569 (App. D.C. 1975); Bethea v. United
States, 365 A.2d 64 (App. D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
3. 471 F.2d at 971.
4. See id. at 980.
5. See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), clari-
fied, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C.), affd 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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conduct. "Appreciate" was not defined in the Brawner decision,
6
and we argued (apparently) successfully that it meant not only cog-
nitive awareness, but also included an emotional understanding of
the consequences of his actions. Hinckley clearly did not have this at
the time of the shooting. The problem we faced was to convince
twelve jurors of that fact, in the face of the extraordinary popularity
of the President at the time.7
Although that was of some concern, prior experiences with Dis-
trict of Columbia jurors compelled me to believe that if we could put
together a defense that was humane in its characterization of the de-
fendant, we would have a shot. We achieved this not only through
live testimony but also by relying on the voluminous writings of
Hinckley, 8 which while not a diary, had the intimacy of one. These
writings had been generated over a period of months prior to the
shooting and included a letter, written the morning of the shooting, to
Jodie Foster,9 then an up-and-coming Hollywood actress. The writ-
ings and the letter to Jodie Foster, standing alone, strongly suggested
that John Hinckley was utterly detached from reality and had no
emotional or cognitive appreciation of it.
We sought the most able and best medical experts we could
find, but shied away from witnesses who had a history of testifying
in criminal trials-although one did-because we did not want our
witnesses to be exposed to cross-examination about their prior expe-
riences as a witness.' 0
A more difficult disqualifying factor arose from the strong feel-
ing on the part of many potential experts that they could not opine on
the ultimate issue of legal responsibility under the applicable law.
This was an imperative requirement for us, as we were only too
6. See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 991-92.
7. See Lou Cannon, Reagan Presses Congress to Act on His Program,
WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1981, at Al (stating that "all the public opinion surveys
show that the president's popularity has soared since the shooting").
8. See generally JACK HINCKLEY ET AL., BREAKING POINTS (Chosen
Books 1985) (contains writings of John Hinckley).
9. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF
JoHNW. HINCKLEY, JR. 11-12 (Godine 1984).
10. See PETER W. Low ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A
CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE 22-82 (Foundation Press 1986) (case
study which highlights expert witness's testimony).
JOHN W. HJNCKLEY JR.
aware that the Government would most certainly offer testimony on
this issue." At the same time, we attempted to interview people who
had known John from his youth up to the time of the shooting. Un-
fortunately, there were not many such people around, as John had
been a loner for many years and had established very few personal
relationships. Fortunately for him, he had very close and under-
standing family members, each of whom contributed whatever time
we asked of them.
As a result, and with the compelling testimony of three psychia-
trists and one psychologist, 12 we presented a very sympathetic por-
trayal of a young man who was friendless, had a terrible sense of
hopelessness, and was totally without the requisite mental capacity to
appreciate (both intellectually and emotionally) the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
Significantly, the defense expert psychologist relied on the results of
tests run by a government psychologist within days of the shootings,
to support his conclusions.' 3 The Government declined to call this
witness although he was available.
As may appear obvious from the above, Hinckley also lacked
the mental resources essential for him to take care of himself. These
are not totally unusual characteristics, occurring in many individuals
in our society today, and regrettably we are without the process or
systems to prevent the tragedies which so often result from their ab-
sence. There can be no doubt that the outcome was a proper one.
Today, John Hinckley, as suggested by the local press, has had some
recovery from his terrible illness and is hopefully on his way to total
recovery.
Unfortunately, our law enforcement officials seem to have taken
it upon themselves to interfere with the appropriate medical treat-
ment that St. Elizabeth's Hospital has sought to provide. At one
point in time the Secret Service hired a psychiatrist at St. Elizabeth's
11. See id. at 61-63 (government expert's testimony).
12. See id. at 30-36, 49-61, 64-80 (defense experts' testimony).
13. See id. at 30-36 (defense psychologist's testimony).
14. See Bill Miller, Hinckley's Outings Won't Be Announced: Officials List
Privacy Safety, WASH. POST, July 31, 1999, at B01 (hospital staff members
believed that Hinekley's condition "has improved enough for him to go into
the community from time to time with supervision, and a recent court ruling
cleared the way for the outings").
January 2000)
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to study John's progress, but did not disclose this arrangement to
John Hinckley or his parents, all of whom were in group therapy
with the psychiatrist.
The government has continuously opposed efforts to permit
Hinckley to have limited off-campus privileges. When he recently
convinced a court to permit such an excursion, law enforcement offi-
cials imposed such a tight watch on the hospital staff's efforts that
the off-campus excursion had to be canceled. The law enforcement
officials do not appear to understand that Hinckley is not a convicted
defendant but a patient in a mental hospital with all of the rights that
such a patient might enjoy. If law enforcement officials would only
leave him alone, the rehabilitation process would probably be expe-
dited.
The 1984 amendments to the insanity law of the District of Co-
lumbia did little to change the applicable legal standard, since the
word "appreciate" still remains in the new law.15 It did shift the bur-
den of proof of insanity to the accused,' 6 which probably discourages
the use of the defense, but given the facts in the Hinckley case that
burden would probably be met today as it was in 1982.
The last significant statutory change was the prohibition for any
expert to express an opinion on the ultimate issue of legal responsi-
bility. 17 While facially it would appear to make the insanity defense
more difficult to raise, in reality, the change does little more than
15. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2057 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1999) ("It is an affirmative
defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the com-
mission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a se-
vere mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or the wrongfulness of his acts.")).
16. See id. (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1999)) ("The defen-
dant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing
evidence.").
17. See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2067 (codified as amended at FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (1984) ("No expert witness
testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a
criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the
trier of fact alone.").
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increase the pool of experts who would be available to assume the
task that many declined in the Hinckley case.
Some say that the case did much to harm the insanity defense,'
but we all believed that it was an important issue---not only to John
Hinckley, but also to the public so that it could become aware that
the actions of so many of our citizens are the result of deranged
minds, incapable of experiencing the usual checks on behavior that
are the norm. Until some way can be found to identify the danger-
ously mentally ill members of our society in advance of tragedy,
these incidents of apparent wanton cruelty will simply continue.
Our legal and medical systems need some type of resource to re-
ceive reports of threatened misbehavior and to act upon that infor-
mation, including the initiation of commitment proceedings. Only
with such resources can the horrors we have witnessed in the last few
years or so be prevented. It is not a problem that will go away sim-
ply by throwing money at it-much more is needed. What is neces-
sary is a process that will screen out the demonstrably dangerous in-
dividuals who are permitted to acquire the most terrible weapons
available to terrorize our schools, our churches, and our streets. The
easy political answer is to imprison the offender without any recog-
nition that our world has a plethora of some very dangerous and
needy people. Our society is generally oblivious of the problem until
some disaster strikes and only then is the issue given any serious
thought. It continues today and cries out for a political solution.
18. See Adrienne Drell, Insanity Plea: The Defense of Last Resort, CHI.
SuN TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at 61, available in 1999 WL 6538376 (referring to a
"wave of state and federal legislation that erupted after John Hinckley was ac-
quitted by reason of insanity"); see also Gita M. Smith, Slain Deputy
Mourned: Mental State a Likely Issue, but Risky Defense, ATLANTA J. &
ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 24, 1998, at JJ;07, available in 1998 WL 3716775;
Louise D. Palmer, Capitol Slay Suspect's Mind an Issue of Life, Death,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1998, atA2, available in 1998 WL 9147484.
January 2000]
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